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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ORANGE COUNTY CORRECTION OFFICERS 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-3846 
COUNTY OF ORANGE and SHERIFF OF ORANGE 
COUNTY, 
Employer, 
- and -
ORANGE COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Intervenor. 
KAUFF, McCLAIN & McGUIRE (HARLAN J. SILVERSTEIN and BETH J. 
FALK of counsel), for Petitioner 
PROSKAUER, ROSE, GOETZ & MENDELSOHN (KATHLEEN M. McKENNA 
of counsel), for Employer 
WILSON & FRANZBLAU (KENNETH J. FRANZBLAU of counsel), 
for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On May 21, 1991, the Orange County Correction Officers 
Benevolent Association (COBA) petitioned to represent certain 
Sheriff's Department personnel employed jointly by the County of 
Orange and the Sheriff of Orange County (County). COBA's petition 
was held in abeyance by the Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Director) pending the disposition of two 
improper practice charges filed against the County by the Orange 
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County Deputy Sheriff's Association, Inc. (DSA) because the improper 
practice charges could affect the processing of the petition. By 
decision dated January 31, 1992,-1 we rejected DSA's claim that the 
unit for which it was certified in 1981 included only deputy 
sheriffs. We found, rather, that the unit for which the DSA was 
certified included all of the departmental personnel covered by the 
joint employer relationship between the County and the Sheriff.^ 
That is the unit COBA now seeks to represent by this petition. In 
our decision of January 31, we also held that the County had 
improperly recognized COBA in May 1990 as the bargaining agent for 
DSA's unit and we ordered COBA's recognition rescinded. 
In its response to COBA's petition, DSA raised certain 
objections to the processing of the petition. The Director 
permitted DSA to file an offer of proof and a memorandum of law in 
support of its objections. DSA argued to the Director in those 
papers that COBA's petition should be dismissed because the County's 
recognition of COBA deprived it of its right to bargain on behalf of 
the unit for which it was certified. DSA also argued that COBA's 
petition was untimely because COBA was the recognized bargaining 
agent when it filed the petition. Finally, DSA alleged that the 
unit COBA seeks to represent is not the most appropriate. DSA 
^25 PERB f3004 (1992). 
27The unit's'correction officers, for example, are no longer 
deputy sheriffs. The County eliminated that status for the 
correction officers and a number of other positions within the 
Sheriff's Department by a civil service reclassification which 
was effective in February 1990. 
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alleges that there should be two units, one consisting of all deputy 
sheriffs and the other consisting of all other Sheriff's Department 
personnel. 
The Director's decision on DSA's objections was transmitted to 
the parties by letter dated March 2, 1992, in which he denied DSA's 
objections and ordered an election in the existing unit. DSA has 
filed exceptions to the Director's determination. DSA argues that 
the Director erred by processing COBA's petition, that he failed to 
address certain of its objections, and that the unit for which an 
election was ordered is not the most appropriate. In their response 
to DSA's exceptions, both the County and COBA argue that the 
Director's decision is correct and that DSA's objections are 
meritless. 
We affirm the Director's determination and dismiss DSA's 
exceptions. 
DSA's major contention is that COBA's petition should be 
dismissed because DSA should be given a reasonable period of time to 
negotiate a contract with the County, an opportunity it claims it 
lost in May 1990 when the County improperly recognized COBA. DSA's 
argument, however, ignores two salient facts which make its request 
for this type of equitable relief inappropriate. First, at the date 
the County recognized COBA, DSA was open to challenge by other 
unions under our Rules of Procedure (Rules). Therefore, the 
County's recognition of COBA did not deprive it of any part of an 
insulated period, unlike the circumstance in Village of 
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Sloatsburg,-7 the case DSA relies upon in support of its position. 
Second, DSA itself refused to bargain with the County for certain of 
the titles in its certified unit. The record of the improper 
practice proceedings makes it clear that DSA simply was not 
interested in bargaining across the full range of its certified 
unit. Even if the County had not recognized COBA in May 1990, we 
are not persuaded that DSA would have availed itself of an 
opportunity to bargain a contract covering the existing unit. The 
County's improper recognition of COBA, therefore, affords us no 
reason to dismiss COBA's petition and it must be processed if it has 
been otherwise properly filed pursuant to our Rules. 
In that latter respect, DSA alleges that the petition must be 
dismissed as untimely because COBA was the incumbent union at the 
date its petition was filed. Although the Director did not 
specifically consider this objection, our decision on DSA's improper 
practice charges is necessarily dispositive. By our decision of 
January 31, 1992, we ordered COBA's recognition rescinded. Having 
had its recognition nullified, COBA's petition is correctly 
processed under §201.3(e) of our Rules, which permits petitions by 
unions, other than the incumbent, to be filed during the period from 
120 days after expiration of a contract-7 between an employer and 
an incumbent union until a new contract is executed. When COBA's 
petition was filed, DSA's improper practice charge alleging that 
5/20 PERB f4003, aff'd on other grounds, 20 PERB 53014 (1987). 
-'DSA's last contract with the County expired on December 31, 
1989. 
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COBA had been improperly recognized was already pending. The 
County's improper recognition of COBA gave COBA no rights of 
incumbency at any time. COBA's petition would have been properly 
dismissed had we upheld the County's recognition because it would 
have been untimely filed by the incumbent bargaining 
representative.-' Having voided COBA's recognition, however, 
COBA's petition is timely filed by a union challenging DSA as the 
majority representative for the existing unit. 
DSA last objects to the Director's order of an election, 
alleging that the unit is inappropriate. We hold, however, that DSA 
cannot raise a unit question in response to COBA's petition which 
raises only an issue of majority support within the existing unit. 
In Town of Brookhaven, -; we held that an employer could not 
challenge the appropriateness of a unit outside of the one-month 
window period provided in §201.3(d) of our Rules-7 in response to a 
union's petition seeking to replace the incumbent union as the 
representative for an existing unit. The Director refused to 
consider the unit question as raised by the employer and ordered an 
election in the existing unit. We affirmed the Director's decision 
in that case and, as the material circumstances are no different 
here, we similarly affirm his decision in this case. We again 
^Village of Sloatsbura, 20 PERB f3014 (1987). 
^19 PERB 1[3010 (1986) . 
^DSA, as the incumbent union, was similarly restricted to that 
one-month period for filing challenges to the composition of its 
unit. 
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express no opinion, however, about the appropriateness of the 
existing unit. It is not an issue properly before us at this time. 
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that 
DSA's exceptions are denied, the Director's decision is affirmed, 
and the case is remanded for an election as ordered by the Director. 
DATED: April 30, 1992 
New York, New York 
4=^ %j^ \<^fU 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter^ -fc. Eisenberg, Memb«nr 
Ericxfr Schmertz, Member/ 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SCHENECTADY POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and-
CITY OF SCHENECTADY, 
Respondent. 
GRASSO AND 6RASS0 (JANE K. FININ and KATHLEEN R. DeCATALDO 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH, P.C. (JAMES W. ROEMER, JR. and 
ELAYNE 6. GOLD of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the City of 
Schenectady (City) and the Schenectady Police Benevolent 
Association (PBA) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALT) on a charge filed by the PBA against the City. 
The PBA alleges in its charge that the City violated 
§209-a.l(a), (c) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) when it unilaterally established several new rules and 
procedures in February and March of 1990 pertaining to the 
implementation of General Municipal Law (GML) §207-c. GML §207-c 
obligates the City to pay a police officer who is injured or 
becomes ill in the line of duty the full amount of his or her 
salary or wages, medical and hospital expenses. 
CASE NO. U-11559 
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After a hearing, the ALJ dismissed the subparagraph (a) and 
(c) allegations for lack of proof.-7 The ALJ also dismissed 
those parts of the PBA's subparagraph (d) allegation which 
concern the City's requirement that an injured police officer 
assume a light duty position and that an employee submit to 
surgery as ordered by the City as a condition to the receipt of 
GML §207-c benefits. The PBA argues in its exceptions that the 
ALJ erred on the law in dismissing the first because the light 
duty requirement is, contrary to the ALT's conclusion, 
mandatorily negotiable, and erred on the facts in dismissing the 
second because the City's new surgical requirement, which the ALJ 
held was mandatorily negotiable, changed a prior practice. The 
ALJ otherwise sustained the PBA's charge, holding that the City 
violated §2 09-a.l(d) of the Act when it: 
1. required injured officers to submit to a physical 
examination on the officers' own time after returning 
to work; 
2. required reinjured officers to report the date of 
original injury to the desk officer with a verifying 
medical report; 
3. required officers to obtain an authorization from the 
City's physician for any surgical procedure recommended 
by the officers' personal physician; and 
4. required officers to execute a medical confidentiality 
waiver form to the City's examining physician when the 
-'No exceptions have been taken to this aspect of the ALJ's 
decision. 
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officers appeared for examination of a GML §207-c 
injury. 
The ALJ held that these four requirements were mandatorily 
negotiable and that the City unilaterally changed its practice by 
their imposition. 
The City argues in its exceptions that the four rules or 
procedures enumerated above are not mandatorily negotiable. In 
this respect, the City argues that GML §207-c preempts any duty 
to bargain, that the ALJ failed to identify and properly balance 
its interests in promulgating these rules and incorrectly 
disregarded the City's practice under the Workers' Compensation 
Law in deciding that the promulgation of the GML §207-c 
procedures changed its practice. The City, however, has not 
filed any exceptions to the ALJ's findings of fact. 
This is the third recent case we have had involving the 
City's promulgation and enforcement of rules designed to 
implement the provisions of the GML. In addressing GML §207-c 
procedures in one case,-7 we had an opportunity to consider 
indirectly the City's argument here that GML §207-c preempts any 
duty to bargain over the procedures by which the statutorily 
mandated payments of wages and health care expenses are made. We 
there observed that bargaining which is otherwise required by the 
Act is preempted by a different statute only when the different 
g/City of Schenectady, 19 PERB f3051 (1986), conf'd, City of 
Schenectady v. PERB, 135 Misc.2d 1088, 19 PERB f7023 (Alb. Co. Sup. 
Ct. 1986), aff'd, 132 A.D.2d 242, 20 PERB }[7022 (3d Dep't 1987), 
motion for leave to appeal denied, 71 N.Y.2d 803, 21 PERB ^7007 
(1988) . 
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statute dictates "conduct to such an extent that a public 
employer cannot impose variations of such conduct."-7 Because 
the ALJ's negotiability determination was not raised to us on 
appeal in that case, we had no occasion to consider a preemption 
argument any further, nor did we there reach the merits of the 
ALJ's negotiability determination. 
In a second case-7 involving similar statutory wages and 
benefits paid to fire fighters pursuant to GML §2 07-a, we held 
that the City's promulgation and implementation of certain new 
procedures designed to implement GML §207-a were terms and 
conditions of employment which had to be bargained prior to 
implementation. 
The subject matter of GML §207-c is an employee's wages, 
salary and other economic benefits. All of the procedures 
promulgated by the City, including the light duty and surgical 
requirements, condition, restrict, and potentially deny the 
employee's receipt of these wages and economic benefits. The 
§207-c benefits are all a form of wages, and wages are by 
definition in §201.4 of the Act "terms and conditions of 
employment". To whatever extent some balance may be required or 
warranted, we are unable to identify in the conditions for the 
payment of an employee's wages and economic benefits any mission-
related managerial interests which would favor a finding that any 
of these procedures are not terms and conditions of employment. 
^19 PERB f3051, at 3108 (1986). 
^Citv of Schenectady, 24 PERB 5[3 016 (1991) . 
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As to the City's argument that the ALJ improperly 
disregarded the City's practice under the Workers' Compensation 
Law, we agree with the ALJ that the City's practice under that 
statute is not material to its practices under the GML. The two 
statutes are distinct and impose their own set of rights, duties 
and privileges. 
We turn lastly to the City's argument that GML §207-c 
preempts the bargaining which is otherwise required by our 
conclusion that the procedures in issue are terms and conditions 
of employment. As we view it, the City's general preemption 
argument embraces three distinct legal theories. 
First, we reject any notion that GML §207-c procedures in 
issue are prohibited subjects of bargaining. As the Court of 
Appeals^7 has now made manifestly clear, bargaining over terms 
and conditions of employment is not prohibited unless a statute 
clearly prohibits bargaining or the bargaining would necessitate 
the employer's surrender of some nondelegable duty or 
responsibility whether arising under statute, constitution or 
public policy. GML §2 07-c does not by its terms prohibit such 
bargaining in any relevant respect nor does it mandate any of the 
procedures the City adopted. Therefore, negotiations about these 
GML §207-c procedures are not prohibited. 
Second, we also reject the City's preemption claim to 
whatever extent it is intended to encompass an argument that 
-'Board of Educ. of the City School Dist. of the City of 
New York v. PERB, 75 N.Y.2d 660, 23 PERB 17012 (1990). 
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the procedures it adopted did not have to be bargained because 
they were the undertakings minimally necessary to implement 
GML §207-c. The City has processed GML §207-c claims for years 
under procedures different from those it adopted in February and 
March 1990, thereby establishing that the new procedures were not 
minimally necessary to the implementation of GML §207-c. The 
City may have found those earlier procedures to be inadequate to 
its current purposes, but that does not permit the City to avoid 
its obligation under the Act regarding the imposition of the new 
GML §207-c requirements. 
The City's third preemption theory raises an issue of 
legislative intent. The Legislature may, of course, exempt terms 
and conditions of employment from the scope of compulsory 
negotiations by sufficiently plain and clear evidence of that 
intent.-' Having reviewed GML §207-c and the cases arising 
thereunder, we find sufficient evidence of that intent regarding 
the City's imposition of a light duty assignment and its 
imposition of the requirement that employees submit to surgery as 
ordered by the City or forfeit GML §207-c benefits. In both of 
these respects, but not otherwise, GML §207-c by its terms 
defines both the employer's and employee's rights and obligations 
and it further specifies the consequences to the employee for 
noncompliance. Superimposed upon this statutory scheme in these 
-See, e.g., Webster Cent. School Dist. v. PERB, 75 N.Y.2d 619, 
23 PERB f7013 (1990); Elmira City School Dist. v. PERB, 74 N.Y.2d 
395, 22 PERB f7032 (1989). 
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respects is a judicially created system of due process hearing 
protections.-7 
In GML §207-c, insofar as it applies to an employer's right 
to make light duty assignments and its right to treat injured 
employees with surgery as may be appropriate, is the same type of 
legislative scheme as the one the Court of Appeals in Webster 
Central School District v. PERB (Webster)-7 found to be 
sufficient to exempt an employer from a duty to bargain a 
decision which would otherwise have been mandatorily negotiable 
under the Act. It is true that, unlike in Webster, the GML 
predates the Act. However, the language of GML §2 07-c-/ and its 
system of administration in these two respects is incompatible 
with a decisional bargaining obligation. It is that 
incompatibility, not the dates of enactment of the two statutes, 
-See, e.g., Hodella v. Town of Greenburgh, 73 A.D.2d 967 (2d 
Dep't 1980), motion for leave to appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 708 
(1980). 
-
7Supra note 6. 
-'Section 2 07-c.l provides in relevant part that "the municipal 
health authorities or any physician appointed . . . by the munici-
pality . . . may attend any such injured or sick policeman, from 
time to time, for the purpose of providing medical, surgical or 
other treatment, or for making inspections . . . . Any injured or 
sick policeman who shall refuse to accept medical treatment or 
hospital care or shall refuse to permit medical inspections . . . 
shall be deemed to have waived his rights . . . in respect to 
expenses for medical treatment or hospital care rendered and for 
salary or wages payable after such refusal." 
Section 2 07-C.3 provides in relevant part that " . . . payment 
of the full amount of regular salary or wages . . . shall be 
discontinued with respect to such policeman if he shall refuse to 
perform such light police duty if the same is available and offered 
to him provided, however, that such light duty shall be consistent 
with his status as a policeman and shall enable him to continue to 
be entitled to his regular salary or wages . . . ." 
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which dictates the result we reach. Whether a particular light 
duty assignment—'' or ordered surgery is consistent with the 
employee's rights under GML §2 07-c or under the parties' contract 
are issues unrelated to this negotiability determination. We 
consider such issues to be appropriate for judicial review or 
arbitration. We express no opinion as to whether and to what 
extent the procedural implementation of these two requirements 
might be mandatorily negotiable because those questions are not 
raised in this case. 
Our negotiability determination makes it unnecessary to reach 
the PBA's remaining exception that the City's surgical requirement 
changed its prior practice. Even if there were such a change, the 
City's unilateral action in conditioning payment of GML §207-c 
benefits upon an employee's willingness to undergo surgery as 
ordered by the City would not violate the Act because the City is 
not under any duty to bargain that particular decision. 
For the reasons set forth above, we deny the parties' 
exceptions and affirm the ALJ's decision to the extent it is 
consistent with our decision herein. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the City of Schenectady: 
1. Immediately rescind and cease implementation of its GML 
§2 07-c procedures which require a previously disabled 
officer to submit to a physical examination on the 
—'For example, the PBA argues in its exceptions that the ALJ 
mischaracterized the City's right to require light duty under GML 
§207-c. The PBA alleges that a light duty assignment may be made 
under GML §2 07-c only if an officer has first been found to be 
ineligible for or is not granted a disability retirement. 
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officer's own time after returning to work; require an 
officer suffering a recurrence of a duty-related injury 
to submit the original date of injury and verifying 
medical reports; require an officer to obtain prior 
authorization from the City's physician for surgical 
treatment recommended by the officer's personal 
physician; or require an officer to execute a medical 
confidentiality waiver form to the City's examining 
physician. 
2. Make unit employees whole for any wages, salary, or 
other benefits lost as a result of the implementation 
of any of the aforementioned procedures with interest 
at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate; 
3. Sign and post notice in the form attached in all 
locations at which informational notices to unit 
employees are ordinarily posted by the City. 
DATED: April 30, 1992 
New York, New York 
^ w j ^ KM/va|u 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
t 
Walter L. E i senbe rg , Membe 
E n c / d . Schmertz, Member 
APPENDIX 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify
 an employees in the unit represented by the 
Schenectady Police Benevolent Association that the City of 
Schenectady will: 
1. Immediately rescind and cease-implementation of its General 
Municipal Law §207-c procedures which require a previously 
disabled officer to submit to- a physical examination on the 
officer's own time after returning to work; require an 
officer suffering a recurrence of a duty-related injury to 
submit the original date of injury and verifying medical 
reports; require an officer to obtain prior authorization 
from the City's physician for surgical treatment recommended 
by the officer's personal physician; or require an officer 
to execute a medical confidentiality waiver form to the 
City's examining physician; and 
2. Make unit employees whole for any wages, salary or other 
benefits lost as a result of the implementation of any of 
the aforementioned procedures with interest at the currently 
prevailing maximum legal rate. 
CITY OF SCHENECTADY 
Dated By. • • - • • • • 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, MASSENA 
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL UNIT 8415, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-11846 
MASSENA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MAUREEN SEIDEL of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
WYSSLING, SCHWAN & MONTGOMERY, ESQS. (RICHARD H. WYSSLING 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Massena 
Memorial Hospital (Hospital) to a decision by an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge filed by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Massena Memorial 
Hospital Unit 8415 (CSEA), which has itself filed cross-
exceptions to the ALJ's decision. 
CSEA alleges that the Hospital violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
promulgated and implemented a smoking ban throughout the Hospital 
in July 1990. 
Board - U-11846 
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The ALJ found on a record developed without a hearing that 
until July 1990, employees smoked in the cafeteria, five lounges, 
the CSR kitchen area, the dish rooms, the medical transcription 
room, the purchasing room, the nursing conference rooms, the main 
lobby, and the old chapel. -The ALJ held that the smoking ban was 
mandatorily negotiable as to all of these areas except the main 
lobby and the old chapel. Citing our decision in County of 
Niagara,-7 the ALJ found no violation insofar as the ban applied 
to these latter two areas because they were open to the 
Hospital's patients. The ALJ found, however, that the other 
areas mentioned, except for the cafeteria, were not open to 
either the public or patients. Finding no evidence in the 
stipulated record showing that employees objected to smoking in 
these areas, even in those which might be considered work areas 
under the Clean Indoor Air Act (Air Act) ,-' the ALJ concluded 
that the ban both exceeded the requirements of the Air Act and 
any of the Hospital's managerial interests. As to the cafeteria, 
which continued to be open to visitors as well as to employees, 
the ALJ found that it was not open to patients and that access by 
the public did not render the Hospital's total ban on smoking in 
the cafeteria a nonmandatory subject of negotiation. 
1/21 PERB }[3014 (1988) . 
^N.Y. Pub. Health Law, Art. 13-E (McKinney 1990). 
Board - U-11846 
-3 
The Hospital excepts to certain of the ALT's findings of 
fact and to her legal conclusion that the smoking ban was 
mandatorily negotiable in any respect. Regarding the latter 
point, the Hospital argues that the A U incorrectly applied the 
balancing test for determiningnegotiability of smoking policies. 
CSEA argues that the Air Act has superseded any balancing test 
and has made all workplace smoking rules, except those required 
by the Air Act, mandatorily negotiable per se. but it otherwise 
supports the ALT's decision. 
The Hospital first argues that the ALT erred by identifying 
"male" and "female" lounges in addition to the janitors7 and 
housekeeping lounges. The Hospital alleges that the male and 
female lounges referenced by the ALT are not separate lounges, 
but merely different names for the janitors' and housekeeping 
lounges, respectively, where employees admittedly smoked before 
the ban. Assuming the accuracy of the Hospital's representation 
in this respect, the ALT's error is nonprejudicial to the 
Hospital because the reference to the male and female lounges 
becomes a mere misnomer, which affects neither the finding of a 
violation nor the remedy. On that basis, we deny this part of 
the Hospital's exceptions. 
The Hospital also argues that the record does not establish 
that employees smoked in the radiology lounge before the ban. 
However, in a letter filed by the Hospital with the ALT dated 
January 25, 1991, the Hospital agreed with CSEA's representation 
Board - U-11846 -4 
that employees had smoked in the radiology lounge from March 1987 
to July 1990. This part of the Hospital's first exception is, 
therefore, also denied. 
The Hospital similarly argues that there is no evidence that 
employees smoked in-the CSR kitchenarea, the dish rooms, the 
medical transcription room or the purchasing room. However, the 
record again shows that the ALJ's findings in these respects are 
correct. The parties' joint stipulation of fact shows that the 
CSR kitchen area was a designated smoking area under the 
Hospital's 1989 smoking policy. For the other three areas, the 
Hospital, in its January 25, 1991 letter to the ALJ, again 
specifically admitted that employees smoked in those areas from 
1987 to 1990. 
With respect to these same four areas, the Hospital also 
argues that the ALJ erred by implying that employees consented to 
smoking from an absence of evidence of any objection to smoking 
in those areas. Individual employee consent is made relevant to 
the negotiability of the Hospital's smoking policy by the Air 
Act, which makes employee consent a factor in work areas, 
conference rooms and meeting rooms, as defined in that statute. 
As the ALJ correctly noted, the record does not establish either 
that any of the four areas mentioned in this respect are work 
areas, conference rooms or meeting rooms or that any employees 
ever objected to smoking in those areas. We consider evidence in 
these respects to have been part of the Hospital's defense to 
Board - U-11846 
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CSEA's unilateral change allegation because it is seeking to 
defend the adoption of a smoking ban which, but for the Air Act, 
would violate CSEA's bargaining rights under the Act.-7 There 
being no claim that the Hospital offered to the AKT any evidence 
at all regarding the nature of therooms or the employees' 
objection to smoking therein, it bears the responsibility for the 
omission. 
The Hospital next argues that the AKT erred by finding that 
the cafeteria is not open to patients. The Hospital alleges that 
the cafeteria is open to its patients and that it is frequented 
by them. 
From the ALJ's conclusion that the ban on smoking in the 
main lobby and the old chapel is a management prerogative because 
patients use those areas, it is clear that the ALJ would have 
upheld the smoking ban as it applied to the cafeteria if she had 
found that the Hospital's cafeteria is open to its patients. 
That result would have been a correct application of County of 
Niagara, in which we held that "a health facility . . . may, in 
furtherance of its mission, ban smoking by its employees in those 
areas . . . which are customarily used by its patients."^ 
-
;See, e.g., Oneonta City School Dist., 24 PERB f3025 (1991). 
^21 PERB 53014, at 3030 (1988). 
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We have carefully reviewed the record in this case and we 
find that the ALJ's conclusion that the cafeteria is closed to 
its patients is not supported by the record. The Hospital's 1987 
and 1989 smoking policies do not show that the cafeteria has been 
closed to ±he--Hospitai-^ s---pa-t-ie-nts^ ------We----be-l--ieve>-"moreover>"_th"at"''it' 
is reasonable to presume that areas within a hospital which are 
open to all members of the public are also open to any patients 
who are medically authorized to move about the hospital. There 
being no evidence to rebut that presumption, we reverse the ALJ's 
finding-7 that the cafeteria was not open to the Hospital's 
patients. Our finding that the cafeteria was open to any 
patients at all relevant times and the ALJ's determination on the 
negotiability of the ban as applied to the old chapel and main 
lobby triggers consideration of CSEA's cross-exception. 
CSEA argues that the Air Act supersedes our balancing 
test-7 such that we are prohibited from upholding any aspect of 
a smoking ban under a balancing test. We disagree with this 
proposition. Those aspects of a smoking ban which are more 
-'The presumption substitutes for the absence of proof in this 
respect and satisfies the Hospital's burden of proof on this 
issue. 
-
7We determine the negotiability of many subjects by a balancing 
test, which weighs the interests of both the employer and the 
employees. A somewhat oversimplified summary of the balancing 
test is that a subject is mandatorily negotiable if it is 
primarily related to or affects the employees' terms and 
conditions of employment and nonmandatory if it is primarily 
related to or affects the employer's mission or services to the 
public. 
Board - U-11846 -7 
to "the applicable law governing collective bargaining."^7 The 
applicable law governing collective bargaining includes the use 
of a balancing test to determine the negotiability of many 
subject matters. We have resorted to a balancing test in 
assessing the negotiability of an employer's smoking policies and 
nothing in the Air Act requires us to abandon that approach. 
Therefore, we affirm the ALJ's application of a balancing test to 
determine the negotiability of the Hospital's smoking ban. 
The Hospital's last exception relates to the application of 
that balancing test. The Hospital first argues that the ALJ 
misapplied that balancing test because a smoking ban in any acute 
care facility should be considered per se mission-related and, 
therefore, always a nonmandatory subject of negotiation. 
Acceptance of the Hospital's arguments in this respect would 
necessitate a reversal of County of Niagara. As we continue to 
believe that County of Niagara was correctly decided, and that it 
reflects a proper balance of the rights and interests of 
employers, employees and the public, we deny the Hospital's 
exceptions insofar as it urges us to hold that a smoking ban in 
all hospitals is a nonmandatory subject of negotiation as a 
matter of law. 
The Hospital also argues that it was denied an opportunity 
to present evidence pertaining to the impact of secondary 
smoking, ventilation and other of the Hospital's architectural 
Z/N.Y. Pub. Health Law, §1399-o.6(i) (McKinney 1990). 
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limitations which it believes would have influenced the ALJ's 
negotiability determination in its favor. However, other than 
generally requesting a hearing, the Hospital neither informed the 
ALT that it had evidence material to a negotiability balance nor 
advised her as to thenature of the information it wanted to 
introduce during the several months in which the record was being 
developed. It was not until the Hospital filed its brief with 
the ALJ that it first told her what it wanted to introduce 
regarding the negotiability of its smoking ban. Thus, we do not 
consider the ALJ to have refused the Hospital's request for the 
introduction into the record of relevant evidence. Rather, we 
consider the Hospital to have failed to make a timely request for 
the introduction of that evidence. Therefore, this last aspect 
of the Hospital's exceptions is also dismissed. 
For the reasons set forth above, CSEA's cross-exceptions and 
the Hospital's exceptions, except insofar as the Hospital's 
exceptions pertain to the negotiability of the cafeteria smoking 
ban, are denied, and the ALJ's decision is affirmed, except as 
noted above. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Hospital immediately 
rescind and cease enforcement of its smoking ban, which was 
effective July 15, 1990, as to employees in CSEA's unit, except 
insofar as the smoking ban applies to the Hospital's main lobby, 
old chapel and cafeteria, and that it post the attached notice in 
Board - U-11846 -9 
all locations at which notices of information to CSEA unit 
employees are ordinarily posted. 
DATED: April 30, 1992 
New York, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Waltejp—I*. Eisenberg, Member 
NOTICE T 
APPENDIX 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify employees of Massena Memorial Hospital in the unit 
represented by Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Massena Memorial Hospital Unit 8415 
(CSEA), that Massena Memorial Hospital will rescind immediately 
its smoking ban, as applicable to CSEA unit employees, except as 
to the main lobby, old chapel, and cafeteria. 
MASSENA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL. 
Dated. By. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
#2D - 4/30/92 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NOv--U--1-1-8-4-9-
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF LAW), 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MAUREEN SEIDEL of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (LAUREN DE SOLE of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the State of 
New York (Department of Law) (State) to a decision by the 
Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Assistant Director). After a hearing, the 
Assistant Director held, on a charge filed by the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA), 
that the State violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it prohibited smoking in the Concourse 
Annex of the Department of Law effective June 11, 1990. In 
finding a violation, the Assistant Director rejected the State's 
contention that its smoking ban was mandated by the State's Clean 
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Indoor Air Act (Air Act)-7 because the nonsmoking employees who 
work in the Concourse Annex had complained to it that tobacco 
smoke from designated smoking areas within the Annex was entering 
their smoke-free work areas. 
The State argues in its exceptions that we have no 
jurisdiction to interpret the Air Act and that the Assistant 
Director erred in his interpretation of that statute. CSEA 
argues in response that the Assistant Director's decision is 
correct and should be affirmed. 
As to the State's first exception, its defense to the 
unilateral imposition of the smoking ban rests exclusively upon 
its asserted obligations under the Air Act. CSEA's charge 
complaining of a unilateral change in a mandatory subject of 
negotiation is plainly within our jurisdiction. Therefore, the . 
interpretation of the Air Act is merely incidental to the 
exercise of our improper practice jurisdiction. We cannot accept 
the State's argument in this respect because it would mean that 
we could never exercise jurisdiction under the Act to reach the 
merits of any improper practice charge if the interpretation of a 
different statute were required. Whether the courts would defer 
to our interpretation of the Air Act is immaterial to our right 
and duty to consider that statute alongside our Act in order to 
make a proper disposition of CSEA's charge. For these reasons, 
we deny the State's first exception. 
^N.Y. Pub. Health Law, Art. 13-E (McKinney 1990) . 
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In its remaining exceptions, the State argues that the 
Assistant Director misconstrued controlling provisions of the Air 
Act. As it argued to the Assistant Director, the State again 
argues to us that its smoking ban was necessary to comply with 
the minimum requirements of the Air Act and, therefore, it had no 
right or duty to bargain with CSEA regarding the imposition of 
the smoking ban. For the following reasons, however, we find 
that the Assistant Director correctly interpreted the State's 
obligations under the Air Act and we affirm his decision. 
The Concourse Annex is a place of employment as defined 
under the Air Act.-/ Within the Annex, there are several work 
areas, defined in the Air Act as places "where one or more 
employees are routinely assigned and perform services for their 
employer."-/ An employer is required under §1399-o.6(a) of the 
Air Act to provide its nonsmoking employees "with a smoke-free 
work area." A smoke-free work area is itself defined in the Air 
Act as "an enclosed indoor area in a place of employment where no 
smoking occurs."^ Smoking is defined for purposes of the Air 
Act as "the burning of a lighted cigar, cigarette, pipe or any 
other matter or substance which contains tobacco."-7 
^N.Y. Pub. Health Law, §1399-n.7 (McKinney 1990). 
2/N.Y. Pub. Health Law, §1399-n.l4 (McKinney 1990). 
^N.Y. Pub. Health Law, §1399-n.9 (McKinney 1990). 
^N.Y. Pub. Health Law, §1399-n.l0 (McKinney 1990). 
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The State argues that its obligation to provide its 
nonsmoking employees with a smoke-free work area includes a right 
and obligation to ban smoking in previously designated smoking 
areas whenever it has received complaints from nonsmoking 
employees that tobacco smoke is present in the air within their 
smoke-free work areas. 
The State's interpretation of its obligation, however, 
appears to us to be wrong simply because it misconstrues the 
definition of a smoke-free work area. A smoke-free work area 
under the Air Act is a place in which no burning of tobacco 
products (i.e., smoking) is permitted. It is not an area totally 
free of tobacco smoke, regardless of its origin. Given this 
statutory definition, the State satisfied the mandate of the Air 
Act respecting a smoke-free work area by giving employees a work 
area in which no person is permitted to smoke by burning a 
tobacco product. 
The State, however, buttresses its argument that it was 
required to ban smoking under the circumstances of this case by 
reference to §1399-o.6(b) of the Air Act which permits an 
employer to set aside a work area for smoking if all of the 
employees assigned to that work area agree to its designation as 
a smoking area. Reliance on that section of the Air Act, 
however, is not persuasive. Section 1399-o.6(b) of the Air Act, 
in context with §1399-o.6(a), which immediately precedes it, 
merely means that after having set aside smoke-free work areas 
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within a place of employment for all nonsmoking employees who 
want one, the employer may permit smoking within other areas if 
all of the employees assigned to those smoking areas agree to 
permit smoking. Section 1399-o.6(b) of the Air Act does not mean 
that smoking employees can be denied the smoking privileges the 
Air Act affords them within their work areas, or other places in 
which smoking is not prohibited by the terms of the Air Act, on 
the complaint of the nonsmoking employees who have otherwise been 
given a smoke-free work area as defined and limited in §1399-n.9. 
If our conclusion that the State's smoking ban is more 
restrictive than the requirements of the Air Act and, therefore, 
mandatorily negotiable to that extent,-7 is not compelled by the 
controlling definition of "smoke-free work area", it finds 
further support both in the Air Act's definition of a "smoking 
area" and the Legislature's declared intent in enacting that 
statute. 
Regarding the former, the definition of a smoking area-' 
states that it shall "be separated from a smoke-free work area-' 
by walls or some other means, equally effective in reducing the 
effects of smoke on the smoke-free work area, other than 
s'N.Y. Pub. Health Law, §1399-o.6(i) expressly subjects an 
employer's smoking policies which are more restrictive than the 
minimum requirements of that statute to the "applicable law 
governing collective bargaining." 
^N.Y. Pub. Health Law, §1399-n.ll (McKinney 1990). 
-'The definition of a smoke-free work area in §1399-n.9 also 
provides that it shall be separate from any smoking area. 
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ventilation systems or air cleaning devices." (emphasis added) 
This provision of the Air Act plainly contemplates that smoking 
areas may be established and maintained along with designated 
smoke-free work areas. There is no suggestion in the language 
used in the definition of a smoking area that a smoking ban must 
be established on the complaint of a nonsmoker. We read this 
provision of the Air Act to require only that an employer 
separate smoking areas from smoke-free work areas by walls, or 
means other than walls, which can be no less effective than a 
wall system in reducing the infiltration of tobacco smoke into 
the smoke-free work areas. Having erected walls to separate work 
areas, the State has taken the steps required by the Air Act 
which the Legislature designed to reduce the nonsmokers' exposure 
to tobacco smoke. It was not required to go further and ban 
smoking throughout the Annex. 
Our interpretation of the Air Act is also consistent with 
the Legislature's stated findings.-7 Although noting the 
hazards of second-hand smoke, the Legislature expressly stated 
that a "balance" had to be struck which recognized both the 
rights of the nonsmokers, whom the Legislature wanted to protect, 
and the "need to minimize governmental intrusion into the affairs 
of its citizens." Therefore, the Legislature declared that its 
purposes could be served by "limiting exposure to tobacco smoke." 
The Legislature's stated findings are carried out throughout the 
^1989 N.Y. Laws, c.244, §1. 
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text of the Air Act itself. The Legislature clearly banned 
smoking in a number of areas within a place of employment.—/ 
Where smoking was not banned, however, the provisions of the Air 
Act reflect the Legislature's compromise between the rights of 
smokers and nonsmokers. To permit the State to ban smoking 
everywhere in the Annex because nonsmokers complained that 
tobacco smoke from designated smoking areas had infiltrated the 
air in their smoke-free work areas would disturb the 
legislatively created balance between the rights of smokers and 
the rights of nonsmokers. 
As the Air Act does not provide for mandating a total 
smoking ban throughout the Concourse Annex, the State's 
unilateral imposition of such a ban, which rescinded the smoking 
privileges previously extended to. unit employees within that 
facility, violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act. The Assistant 
Director's decision is, therefore, affirmed and the State's 
exceptions are denied. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the State rescind its June 4, 
19 9 0 memorandum which prohibited smoking in the Concourse Annex 
effective June 11, 1990, restore the smoking policy for the 
Concourse Annex as it existed prior to that date to the extent 
that such policy is in accord with the provisions of the Air Act, 
and sign and post the attached notice at all locations normally 
—''The Air Act expressly prohibits smoking in certain areas within 
a place of employment. N.Y. Pub. Health Law, §1399-o.6(c), (d) & 
(e) (McKinney 1990). 
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used to communicate with CSEA unit employees in the Department of 
Law at Albany worksites. 
DATED: April 30, 1992 
New York, New York 
•<•,•, i A T-NV-4 T-> ' vA ^,,~~n i -^ Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member^ 
Eric J^TSchmertz, Membe' 
APPENDIX 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLiG EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify employees in the unit represented by the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, who 
work in the Department of Law at Albany worksites, that the State 
of New York: 
1. Will rescind its June 4, 1990 memorandum 
which prohibited smoking in the Concourse 
Annex effective June 11, 1990; 
2. Will restore the smoking policy for the 
Concourse Annex as it existed prior to that 
date to the extent such policy is in accord 
with the provisions of the Clean Indoor Air 
Act, Article 13-E of the Public Health Law. 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF LAW) 
Dated. By. (Representative) (Tltla) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. . ... 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HEMPSTEAD CLASSROOM TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-11934 
HEMPSTEAD PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
KAPLOWITZ & 6ALINSON (DANIEL 6ALINS0N of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
COOPER, SAPIR & COHEN (ROBERT E. SAPIR of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Hempstead 
Classroom Teachers Association (Association) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ dismissed the 
Association's charge against the Hempstead Public School District 
(District) which alleges that the District violated §209-a.l(d) 
and (e) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when 
it ceased payment of a $250 longevity stipend after expiration of 
the parties' last contract. The ALJ held that the District's 
obligation to make the $250 longevity payment ended with the 
expiration of the contract by the clear terms of the contract 
itself. Invoking the parol evidence rule, the ALJ rejected proof 
offered by the Association to establish that the parties did not 
intend the $250 longevity payment to expire with the contract on 
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June 30, 1990.-' Accordingly, the ALJ denied the Association's 
request for a hearing and held that the District did not violate 
the Act either when it did not pay the $250 to persons who first 
allegedly became eligible for it after June 30, 1990, or when it 
reduced by $250 the compensation of those unit employees who had 
been paid the $250 longevity during the stated duration of the 
^ parties' contract. 
In its exceptions, the Association argues that it should 
have been afforded a hearing, and that, in any event, the ALJ 
erred by finding that the District was permitted to discontinue 
the $250 longevity payment for those employees who had already 
qualified and been paid that longevity before June 30, 1990, when 
the contract expired. The District argues in response that the 
ALJ's decision was correct in all material respects and should be 
affirmed. 
The contract clause in issue provides: 
Teachers who have completed 2 0 years of 
teaching, including salary schedule credit, 
10 years of which have been served in the 
Hempstead School District, shall receive an 
-'The parol evidence rule basically provides that an agreement 
which is clear in its terms and purports to express the parties' 
entire agreement on a subject cannot be contradicted, varied, or 
explained by the parties' prior or contemporaneous 
communications. Conversely, only contractual language which is 
vague, ambiguous or otherwise subject to more than one 
interpretation may be explained by parol evidence. See 58 N.Y. 
Jur.2d Evidence and Witnesses §§555-618 (1986); Fisch, New York 
Evidence, §§41-64 (2d ed. 1977). We have endorsed the 
application of the parol evidence rule in our proceedings in 
appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., Village of Port Chester, 
18 PERB f3058 (1985). 
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annual longevity stipend in the sum of 
$750.00. Said longevity stipend is "off 
schedule" and, therefore, in addition to the 
scheduled salary paid to the qualifying 
teacher. Additionally, during the years 
1987-88, 1988-89, and 1989-90, the Board 
agrees to pay $250.00 to each teacher 
qualifying for the longevity stipend. 
We agree with both the ALJ and -the District that the — 
District's obligation to make the $250 longevity payment was 
fixed and limited by the plain terms of the parties' last 
agreement to the three school years referenced. Proof from the 
Association offered to establish that the parties actually 
intended something other than what they clearly wrote was 
properly excluded either on application of the parol evidence 
rule or as unpersuasive.-' Therefore, we find that the ALJ did 
not err in denying the Association a hearing pursuant to its 
offer of proof.-7 
Having specifically fixed its obligation to make a $250 
longevity payment to the three-year period referenced, the District 
-'In this latter category is evidence that for approximately 
three months after expiration of the 1984-87 contract, the 
District continued the $250 longevity payment despite the 
presence of language similar to that in the 1987-90 agreement. 
The District's brief practice under an earlier contract, even if 
true, cannot change the plain meaning of the terms in the 
parties' subsequent contract. 
-''in addition to the proof offered to the ALJ, the Association 
for the first time offers to us in its exceptions other 
provisions in its 1987-90 contract which it alleges show that the 
District's obligation to make the $250 longevity payment 
continued after expiration of that contract. Those facts, not 
having been offered to the ALJ, cannot be relied upon to support 
the Association's claim that the ALJ erred by denying it a 
hearing. Moreover, we do not consider these other provisions to 
control the plain meaning of the entirely separate longevity 
clause. 
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was not required to extend that longevity payment to persons who 
had not qualified for it during the stated term of the 1987-90 
contract. The District similarly did not have to continue the $250 
longevity payment as part of the salary of any unit employee who 
had been paid.thatamount for the school years specified in the 
contract. It is clear from the terms of the expired contract that 
the $250 longevity was a necessary component of an individual's 
salary only for the three school years stated in the collective 
bargaining agreement. To require the payment of the $250 
thereafter to any unit employee would extend the District's payment 
obligation beyond the time it agreed those payments would be made, 
thereby nullifying the "sunset" effect of the language.-7 
For the reasons set forth above, the Association's exceptions 
are denied and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby 
is, dismissed. 
DATED: April 30, 1992 
New York, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Cfrai airperson 
falter L/ Eisenberg, Member er 
^2^^^^ 
Eric J.yschmertz, Member 
y 
-'A "sunset" provision is one which, pursuant to the parties' 
agreement, terminates a contract benefit at a specified time or 
upon specified conditions. Suffolk County, 18 PERB f3030 (1985); 
Yonkers City School Dist. , 12 PERB [^3127 (1979) . 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Albany County Local 8 01, Albany County Department of Social 
Services Unit (CSEA) to the dismissal by the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) of a charge it 
filed against the County of Albany (County). The charge, as 
amended, alleges that the County violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when its agents 
threatened disciplinary action against Marge Flynn, president of 
CSEA's Local 801, on December 10 and 12, 1990, if she continued 
to post certain materials on the County's bulletin boards. 
The Director dismissed the charge in its entirety after a 
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hearing. He dismissed the allegations relating to the 
December 10 postings because there was no evidence of any threat 
then having been made against Flynn. The Director also dismissed 
the allegations relating to a second posting Flynn made on 
December- 1-2-.- Crediting--the-Gounty-'s witnesses'- -recollection of -
their conversations with Flynn on December 10 and 12, the 
Director found that Flynn had agreed with the County not to post 
any more of the materials the County considered objectionable 
until CSEA's contractual posting rights were clarified, perhaps 
by a future grievance. Under that circumstance, the Director 
concluded that the suggestion made to Flynn by Charles Curtin, 
the Director of the Legal Division for the County's Department of 
Social Services, that continued postings could lead to discipline 
for insubordination did not violate the Act. 
CSEA argues in its exceptions that the Director's decision 
should be reversed because the record shows that Flynn was 
threatened with discipline for engaging in her statutorily 
protected right to post written information at the worksite 
pertaining to an impasse in negotiations between CSEA and the 
County. The County argues in response that the Director's 
decision must be affirmed because Flynn was not threatened. 
The parties' negotiations for a successor to a contract 
which expired by its terms on December 31, 1989, began in 
September 1989. By December 1990, the parties had completed 
fact-finding and CSEA had undertaken a public relations campaign 
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intended to cause the County to resume negotiations with 
proposals more favorable to CSEA. As part of that campaign, CSEA 
published advertisements in local newspapers, two of which are 
involved in this case. 
She- material Flynn caused to- -be-posted- on -December -1-0 was- an 
enlarged copy of the advertisement that appeared that day in 
Albany's morning newspaper. That advertisement criticizes County 
government for having a $1,000,000 deficit and for using private 
contractors to run the County's public arena. When Flynn 
discovered that the advertisement had been removed, she reposted 
it, this time with a handwritten notation to "all CSEA members" 
that it was the first in a series of advertisements attempting to 
"get the County to return to the bargaining table." The 
December 10 postings were removed on order of the County's 
agents. 
The second advertisement appeared in the local newspaper on 
December 12. This advertisement complained that the County's 
failure to extend a pay raise to its employees was "hurting" the 
local economy, employees' families and the citizens of Albany. 
Flynn copied both the December 10 and 12 newspaper advertisements 
onto one sheet of paper bearing the bold-type heading "CSEA 
Notice" and CSEA's name at the bottom. She then posted this 
piece of paper, which was also removed by the County. 
It is in conversations Flynn had with the Commissioner of 
Social Services, James P. McCaffrey, on December 10 and with 
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Curtin on December 12 that Flynn was allegedly threatened with 
discipline were she to continue to post similar advertisements in 
the future. 
We affirm the Director's dismissal of the charge with 
respectr to -the- December---1-0 posting- because we- do not find any 
evidence that Flynn was threatened with discipline, even when the 
witnesses' testimony is viewed most favorably to CSEA. 
The Director dismissed the allegations regarding the 
December 12 posting because he found that Flynn had agreed in a 
conversation with McCaffrey that, at least temporarily, the 
postings of the type which the County had removed would not be 
continued. CSEA contests this finding of fact, but, in affirming 
the Director's dismissal of the charge, we do not consider it 
necessary to reach that particular issue of fact. As noted 
below, our focus is on the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement. Nor do we consider it necessary to decide whether 
Flynn was threatened with insubordination if she were to continue 
posting as she had on December 10 and 12. For purposes of this 
decision, we will assume that Curtin effectively told Flynn she 
could be brought up on insubordination charges if she refused to 
discontinue her posting of newspaper advertisements on the 
County's bulletin boards. 
CSEA's charge rests entirely upon an alleged threat to 
Flynn's asserted statutory right to post written materials on the 
County's bulletin boards. The parties' contract, however, gives 
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CSEA the nonexclusive right to post "notices" on the County's 
bulletin boards. Without suggesting that Flynn had any rights 
under the Act to access the County's bulletin boards for the 
purpose of posting materials of interest to the unit employees, 
whatever statutory rights.. she may- haveJiad in that respect -were 
replaced by the contractual right to post "notices". Flynn's 
posting was protected only in the general sense that she had a 
right to communicate with employees and others regarding the 
contract negotiations in an effort to rally support for CSEA.-/ 
Whether that general right includes a statutory right to post 
written materials on the County's property is an issue that we 
need not decide, the Director's observations in that respect 
notwithstanding. 
Although we have suggested that an employer may violate the 
Act if it interferes with or discriminates against an employee 
for the employee's exercise of a contract right,-1 we believe 
that such a violation requires minimally that the employee's 
contract right be clear and that the employer's interference or 
discrimination be taken without a colorable claim of 
corresponding right. For example, an employer arguably violates 
y
 See generally New York City Transit Auth. (Alston), 2 0 PERB 
K3065 (1987). 
g/New York City Transit Auth. , 23 PERB [^3016 (1990) . We did not 
specify in that case the circumstances under which a violation of 
contract might constitute an arguable violation of §209-a.l(a) or 
(c) of the Act because that allegation had not been properly 
raised. 
^ 
Board - U-12160 -6 
the Act if it threatens an employee with discipline for filing a 
grievance if the contractual procedure plainly permits the 
employee to file the grievance. 
As the Director indicated in his decision, the conditions 
.which might ..favor a ...statutory violation^ are. not present... in 
this case. Whether the postings of the type Flynn made on 
December 10 and 12 are the type of notices the parties intended 
under their contract could be posted is an issue untested between 
the parties. On the record before us, any claim that Flynn's 
postings were the type of notices which CSEA was permitted by the 
contract to post on the County's bulletin boards is no more or 
less valid than the claim advanced by the County that they were 
not. All we are presented with, therefore, is a difference of 
opinion between the parties about whether Flynn's postings were 
permitted by their contract. As did the Director, we cannot 
conclude in such a circumstance that the County violated the Act 
when it told Flynn that she could face disciplinary charges if 
she persisted in conduct which the County believed was not 
authorized by the contract and which, under the contract, it 
believed it could prohibit. Such a statement is no more 
improperly threatening of an employee's statutory rights than if 
an employer were to tell an employee that the employee's 
violation of contractual or other work rules might subject the 
-We do not express any opinion about whether Flynn's postings 
were the type of "notices" permitted by the parties' contract. 
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employee to disciplinary action, the propriety of which can be 
tested under the contract. We cannot find the latter to be 
improper without substantially interfering with the parties' 
rights and duties under their collective bargaining agreements 
and we do not discern any better reason.to _f.inA_.^ ...vip_lation jof 
the Act on the facts of this case. 
For the reasons set forth above, CSEA's exceptions are 
denied and the Director's dismissal of the charge is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: April 30, 19 9 2 
New York, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chai 
Schmertz, Member 
#2G - 4/30/92 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WATERTOWN EDUCATIONAL CLERICAL ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-3895 
WATERTOWN CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On November 26, 1991, the Watertown Educational Clerical 
Association (petitioner) filed, in accordance with the Rules of 
Procedure of the Public Employment Relations Board, a timely 
petition seeking certification as the exclusive representative of 
certain employees of the Watertown City School District 
(employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in 
which they stipulated that the following negotiating unit was 
appropriate: 
Included: All ten and twelve month employees engaged in 
the performance of clerical, secretarial and 
stenographic duties. 
Excluded: The Internal Auditor, any confidential 
employees, and all other employees. 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was 
held, on March 3, 1992, at which three ballots were cast in favor 
of representation by the petitioner and eight ballots were cast 
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against representation by the petitioner.-7 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a 
majority of the eligible voters in the unit who cast ballots do 
not desire to be represented for the purpose of collective 
bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that... the__p.et.itIon 
should be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: April30,1992 
New York, New York 
CU-fcUA. 
Pauline R. Kmsel la , Chairperson 
UC^UL. Z'-lt 
] Member / Walter L. Eisenberg 
i-c/j. Schmertz, Member / 
y There are 11 eligible employees in the stipulated unit; 
there was one challenged ballot. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JAMES DEPAOLI, et al., 
Petitioners, 
-and- .._ CASE-NO-.--CT.39-13 
TOWN OF NORTH SALEM, 
-and-
TOWN OF NORTH SALEM POLICE 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Employer, 
Intervenor. 
JAMES DEPAOLI, for Petitioner 
RAINS & POGREBIN, P.C. (BRUCE R. MILLMAN of counsel), for 
Employer 
SHELLY B. LOVE CIRAOLO, for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On December 14, 1991, James DePaoli, et al., filed a timely 
petition for decertification of the Town of North Salem Police 
Benevolent Association (intervenor), the current negotiating 
representative for employees of the Town of North Salem in the 
following unit: 
Included: Part-time police officers, sergeants and 
lieutenants. 
Excluded: Chief of police and all other employees. 
Upon consent of the parties, a mail ballot election was held 
on March 13, 1992. The results of this election show that the 
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majority of eligible employees in the unit who cast valid ballots 
no longer desire to be represented for purposes of 
collective negotiations by the intervenor.-' 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the intervenor be, and it 
hereby is, decertified a.s; • the ^negotiating, agent- for- the -unit 
DATED: April 30, 1992 
New York, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chai rperson 
yu&iz- Y~ *7L*~* 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member / 
-
1
 There were 6 eligible voters. Of the 4 ballots cast, 1 was 
for representation and 3 against representation. There were 
no challenged ballots. 
#3A - 4/30/92 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MIDDLETOWN NURSES ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, AFT 
AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
^and-^ CASE NO. C- 3 910 
ENLARGED CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF 
MIDDLETOWN, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Middletown Nurses 
Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected 
by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All registered professional nurses employed by 
the District in the title of School Nurse. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Middletown Nurses 
Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer inL_good_ faith...with. _ jresjp_ecJ:_._.to_...wao;es,.._hours,.._..and.. . 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: April30,1992 
New York, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb 
Erie/J. Schmertz, Member 
#3B - 4/30/92 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AFSCME, COUNCIL 82, 
Petitioner, 
'-and- CASE NO. C-3880 
VILLAGE OF HERKIMER, 
Employer, 
-and-
CHARLES W. SOULE POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSN., INC., 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Charles W. Soule Police 
Benevolent Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
J 
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negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All temporary and full-time patrolmen and 
officers. 
Excluded: Chief of Police and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above_named public _employer_ 
shall negotiate collectively with the Charles W. Soule Police 
Benevolent Association, Inc. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: April 30, 1992 
New York, New York 
%KAK^ X^JLtsil L 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Waltejf L. Eisenberg, Member 
#3C - 4/30/92 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED INDUSTRY WORKERS, 
LOCAL 424, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3892 
SECOND SUPERVISORY DISTRICT OF 
SUFFOLK COUNTY, BOCES II, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 870 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Industry Workers, 
Local 424, has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
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representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Clerical: Cashier, Clerk, Clerk Typist, 
Switchboard operator, Stenographer, Clerk 
Typist Spanish, Senior Clerk, Account Clerk, 
Account Clerk Typist, Senior Clerk Typist, 
Computer Graphics Technician, Principal Clerk, 
_. Senior Account Clerk," Senior Stehographer, 
Purchase Technician, Principal Account Clerk, 
Payroll Supervisor, Principal Stenographer. 
Custodial: Custodial Worker I, Laborer, 
Driver/Messenger, Maintenance Mechanic II, 
Custodial Worker II, Warehouse Worker II, Head 
Custodian, Maintenance Mechanic III, Material 
Control Clerk IV. 
Data Processing: Data Entry Operator, Tape 
Librarian, Data Processing Equipment Operator, 
Senior Data Entry Operator, Senior Data 
Processing Equipment Operator, Data Processing 
Clerk, Computer Technician, Senior Data 
Processing Clerk. 
) Instruction: School Administrative Aide, 
Physical Therapy Assistant, Career Guide 
Technician, Job Development Coordinator, 
Registered Nurse, Labor Relations Specialist 
III, Volunteer Program Coordinator, 
Occupational Therapist, Physical Therapist. 
Other: Bus Transportation Technician, Employee 
Benefits Coordinator. 
Excluded: Secretarial Assistant, Clerk-Typist, and Senior 
Stenographer in the District 
Superintendent/Executive Officer's Office and 
the Stenographers, Account Clerks and Account 
Clerk Typist in the Personnel Office, Secretary 
to the Deputy Superintendent, Secretary to the 
Director of Administrative Services, 
Secretaries to the Assistant Superintendents, 
and the Supervisor of Occupational/Physical 
Therapists. Part-time employees (those who 
work less than 50% of the time worked by a 
regular full-time employee in that same job 
title) are excluded from the bargaining unit. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Industry Workers, 
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Local 424. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 30, 1992 
•New York, New York 
lline R. Kinsella, Cnai rperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membfr 
#3D - 4/30/92 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF SUBSTITUTES IN 
EDUCATION, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-^ahd- CASE NO. C-3 915 
BURNT HILLS-BALLSTON LAKE 
CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the School Alliance of 
Substitutes in Education, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and 
described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
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Unit: Included: All per diem substitute teachers except those 
who have received an appointment by the Board 
to a temporary position. 
Excluded: All others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the School Alliance of 
Substitutes in Education, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 30, 1992 
New York, New York 
#3E - 4/30/92 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF SUBSTITUTES IN 
EDUCATION, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
'^rid'"-''" CASE NO. C-387 8 
SHENENDEHOWA CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the School Alliance of 
Substitutes in Education, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and 
described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All per diem substitute teachers who have been 
given reasonable assurance of continued 
employment. 
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Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the School Alliance of 
Substitutes in Education, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: April30, 1992 
New York, New York 
#3F - 4/30/92 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED INDUSTRY WORKERS, LOCAL 42 4, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3 88 6 
SEAFORD UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
LOCAL 144, DIVISION 100, SEIU, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Industry Workers, 
Local 424, has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon and described below, as their exclusive representative for 
the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
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Unit: Included: All custodians, groundskeepers, maintainers, 
assistant head custodian - evening, elementary 
head custodian, middle school custodian, senior 
high head custodian, head maintainer, and 
cleaners. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named^ ^ 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Industry Workers. 
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation 
to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect 
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April30, 1992 
New York, New York 
f/|Ul^ h~X\.fiAtjU> 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
falter L. Eisenberg, Membefc^ Wal 
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MEMORANDUM 
April 20, 1992 
TO: The Board 
FROM: John Crotty^T^ -^ 
RE: Proposed Rule Changes 
We received 11 responses to the Rule changes last proposed. 
Most support adoption as proposed or take no objection. The 
following summarizes the objections received- by- -catego-ry. -
5201.9(g)(1) Certification Without an Election 
The Rule change proposes that certification without an 
election issue on the basis of cards filed within six months 
before the date of the Director's decision recommending 
certification without an election instead of the date of the 
Board's action. 
Objectors are concerned that the change will permit 
certification on stale cards. That possibility can be minimized 
if not eliminated by the Board giving a priority assignment to any 
case in which there is an exception filed to the Director's 
decision recommending certification without an election. 
One party suggested that it might be preferable to 
calculate majority status for certification from a fixed date 
certain. The date of the Director's decision recommending 
certification, however, is the only point, other than the date of 
the Board's action, that can be used without risking certification 
on unreasonably stale cards. 
I recommend adoption of the change to §201.9(g)(1) as 
originally proposed. 
§204.3(b) Motion for Particularization of the Charge 
§204.3(d) Motion for Particularization of the Answer 
These Rule changes would allow a party to file a response 
to a motion for particularization of either the charge or the 
answer within seven working days of receipt of the motion. 
One objector questioned the need for the change. The Rule 
change is necessary to establish or clarify a party's right to 
file such a response because the current Rules are silent in this 
respect. 
A second objection is that an opportunity for response will 
delay the proceedings. Delay is unlikely given the specified 
response time. Moreover, certain of the AKTs were withholding a 
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decision on a motion for particularization to give the opposing 
parties an opportunity to file a response. Stating a right to 
respond and fixing a due date for response may actually speed the 
adjudication process. 
One objector is concerned that seven days is too short a 
period of time for a response. The purpose for fixing the 
response at seven days was to conform to other parts of the Rules 
which fix that type of time frame and to avoid any undue delay in 
"the~ proceedings.; - However,- our caselaw -establishes- that- it-is 
within the ALJ's discretion to extend the time periods for filing 
various types of pleadings. An AKJ would be privileged for good 
cause to extend the seven days for the response to these motions. 
I recommend adoption of these Rule changes as proposed. 
5204.3fg) 
This new Rule would permit a public employer which is made 
a party by law to a duty of fair representation charge to file a 
responsive pleading. The objection to this Rule is that it 
imposes an unfair burden on an employer. A response, however, is 
not required, merely permitted. The Rule was intended to provide 
an employer with an opportunity to respond to a charge to the 
extent the employer considered a response appropriate and to 
clarify what had been an uncertainty in that respect. 
I recommend that this Rule be adopted as proposed. 
5207.7fb) Additional Lists 
This Rule change provides that a party may request an 
additional panel list for arbitration if more than three names are 
unacceptable. The current Rule provides that the additional list 
can be requested if more than two names are unacceptable. The 
increase was necessitated by another proposed change in §207.7 
which increases the number of panelists on a list from five to 
seven. 
The objection to the change in §2 07.7(b) is that it may 
decrease a party's opportunity to reject arbitration lists. That 
would not appear to be the case, however, because the change is 
occasioned by the increase in the size of the panel list itself. 
Moreover, administration of the arbitration process may be 
benefited to whatever extent this change may arguably decrease a 
party's opportunity to reject a panel list. 
I recommend that §207.7(b) be adopted as proposed. 
-3-
5210.1(a) Filing of Petition 
This Rule change'requires that a petition for a declaratory 
ruling be submitted in writing on a form prescribed by the 
Director and be signed and sworn to before any person authorized 
to administer oaths. The change addresses an omission in the 
current Rules. 
One party questioned whether there would be a sufficient 
avai1 abirl ity ~ of ^ f orms-.—Parties have been- not if ied -e f these -Rule 
changes in different ways and there will be forms available in all 
offices and available at any party's request. 
Another party questioned why the form is required to be 
sworn when representation petitions are not required to be sworn. 
A declaratory ruling parallels both a representation proceeding, 
in which pleadings are not sworn, and an improper practice 
proceeding in which pleadings are sworn. However, as the 
declaratory ruling petition can be used to contest the 
arbitrability of issues in a compulsory interest arbitration 
proceeding, I recommend the Board adopt the rule change as 
proposed. The Board may consider at a later date whether to 
require all pleadings to be sworn. 
In summary, I recommend that the Rules be adopted in final 
form as originally proposed. 
cc: Sandra Nathan 
Directors 
RULE MAKING ACTIVITIES NYS Register/February 26. 1992 
Two definitions are added: "Consummat ion of the p lan" and 
"Filing". Copies of the escrow agreement and, if applicable, the letter 
of credit, or bond must be included as exhibits to the plan. 
Final rule as compared with last published rule: Substantive changes 
were made in: 18.3(p)(2); 20.3(c)(3), (5), (6); :i.3(l); 22.3(k); 23.3(q): 
24.3(m). 
Text of rule, the revised regulatory impact statement, if any, the revised 
regulatory flexibility analysis, if any, and the assessment of public 
comment, if any, may be obtained from: Mary Sabatini DiStephan, 
Department of Law, 23rd Fl., 120 Broadway, New York, NY 10271, 
(212) 341-2166 
Regulatory Impact Statement 
There is no change to the substance of the regulatory impact statement 
as originally published in the Sfare Register on September 25, 1991. 
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis -
There is no change to the substance of the regulatory flexibility analysis 
as originally published in the State Register on September 25, 1991. 
Assessment of Public Comment 
The Department of Law received four letters containing comments to 
the proposed amendments to Parts 13, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 of Title 13 
NYCRR concerning the escrow and trust fund requirements for sales 
made pursuant to the Martin Act. 
Many of the comments requested clarification of some requirements. 
Some rewording resulted but did not involve substantive change. Other 
items which were recommended to be eliminated were retained in order 
to adequately protect the down payments of the investing public in 
compliance with the statutory mandate. 
The original regulation required that all escrow accounts be fully 
insured. Several comments indicated that this was impractical and would 
require multiple accounts. Communication with the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) confirmed that it wiil insure sub-accounts 
of a master escrow account so long as the bank is advised of the type of 
account, the account is clearly titled as an escrow account, and each 
beneficiary is identified. A problem would arise if an individual down 
payment were in excess of S100,000 (which would generally indicate more 
than a million dollar purchase). The regulation was amended to have 
sponsors include a special risk that down payments in excess of S 100,000 
would not be federally insured beyond 5100,000. 
Provision was made for the possibility of accepting instruments for 
down payments other than checks, drafts or money orders including wire 
transfers, so long as the instrument identifies the payor. 
Although the seven year recordkeeping requirement is one year longer 
than the contract statute of limitations and the Martin Act requirement 
for sponsors to maintain documents associated with the offering plan, 
seven years is required pursuant to Appellate Division rule for attorneys 
holding escrow funds and, therefore, was retained in the regulations. 
The ability of a purchaser to rescind his or her contract if such 
purchaser does not receive timely notice of the deposit of the escrowed 
funds was limited to a 90-day period following tender of the down 
payment and only if the sponsor cannot demonstrate substantial 
compliance with the regulation. The right is triggered only after fifteen 
business days following tender of the deposit. 
A transition period for implementation of these regulations was 
included. Sponsors have sixty days from the effective date of the new 
regulations to transfer funds to escrow accounts in compliance with the 
regulation. 
A bankruptcy filing will not be an automatic ground for release of 
secured deposits. A determination that rescission is required would be 
necessary. 
Forms were amended to comply with the regulatory changes. 
DEPARTMENT OF 
MOTOR VEHICLES 
N O T I C E O F A D O P T I O N 
Restricted "Licenses 
I.D. No. MTV-45-91-00009-A 
Filing No. 2S7 
Filing date: Feb. 11, 1992 
Effective date: Feb. 26. 1992 
PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE State Administrative 
Procedure Act. NOTICE is hereby given of the following action: 
Action taken: Amendment of sections 135.7, 135.9 and 135.12 of Title 
15 NYCRR. 
Statutory authority: Vehicle and Traffic Law, sections 214(a). 510-6 and 
530(1), (3) and (9) 
Subject: Issuance and revocation of restricted licenses and restoration of 
driver's licenses. 
Purpose: To provide for a friore detailed review of the~driving-records 
of applicants for restricted and full licenses and to require revocation of 
a restricted license upon conviction of certain traffic infractions. 
Text was published in the notice of proposed rule making, !.D. No. 
MTV-45-91-00009-P, Issue of November 6, 1991. 
Final rule as compared with last published rule: No changes. 
Text of rule, the revised regulatory impact statement, if any, the revised 
regulatory flexibility analysis, if any, and the assessment of public 
comment, if any, may be obtained from: Neal W. Schoen, Assistant 
Counsel, Legal Bureau, Department of Motor Vehicles, Empire State 
Plaza, Swan St. Bldg., Albany, NY 1222S, (518) 474-0S71 
Assessment of Public Comment 
The agency received no public comment. 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONS BOARD 
H / P R O P O S E D R U L E M A K I N G 
/ \ ^ . N O H E A R I N G ( S ) S C H E D U L E D .,. 
Procedures Before the Publ ic Employment Relations Board 
I.D. No. PRB-08-92-00016-P 
PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE State Administrative 
Procedure Act, NOTICE is hereby given of the following proposed rule: 
Proposed action: Amendment of sections 201.9(g)(1); 204'.3(b) and (d); 
207.7, 207.7(a), (b) and 207.16; 210.1(a); and addition of new subdivision 
(g) to section 204.3 of Title 4 NYCRR. 
Statutory authority: Civil Service Law, section 205.5 
Subject: Procedures before the Public Employment Relations Board 
(PERB) and the certification of collective bargaining representatives; the 
response to a motion for particularization; the process by which parties 
select arbitrations for voluntary grievance arbitrations and the number 
of copies of such arbitration award which must be filed with PERB's 
Director of Conciliation; the form of a petition for declaratory ruling; 
and the responsive pleading of a public employer to an improper practice 
charge that an employee organization breached its duty of fair 
representation with respect to the processing of, or failure to process, a 
claim that the public employer breached its agreement with such employee 
organization. 
Purpose: To provide for the ascertainment of an employee 
organization's majority status for purposes of certification without an 
election as of the date of the decision by the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation recommending certification 
without an election; to provide for responses to motions for 
particularization of improper practice charges and answers; to increase 
the number of names on a list of panel arbitrators from which parties to 
can choose an arbitrator for voluntary grievance arbitrations and to 
provide that parties may strike no more than four names and rank the 
remaining names from such a panel list and to provide that a party may 
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request an additional panel list if it determines that more than three 
names on a panel list are unacceptable and to provide that an arbitrator 
shall file one copy of the arbitration award with PERB's Director of 
Conciliation; to provide that a petition for declaratory ruling shall be 
sworn to and be on a form prescribed by the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation; to allow a public employer 
to file a responsive pleading to an improper practice charge alleging that 
a public employee organization breached its duty of fair representation 
with respect to processing, or by failing to process, a claim that such 
public employer breached its agreement with such employee organization 
and to further provide that failure to file such a responsive pleading may 
be deemed a waiver of the public employer's right to participate in any 
hearing held on the improper practice charge. 
Text of proposed rule: 1. Paragraph 1 of subdivision (g) of section 
201.9 is hereby amended to read as follows: 
20L.'9(g)(l) Certification without an election. If the choice available to 
the employees.in a negotiating unit is limited to the selection or rejection 
of a single employee organization, that choice may be ascertained by the 
director on the basis of dues deduction authorizations and other evidences 
instead of by an election. In such a case, the employee organization 
involved will be certified without an election if a majority of the 
employees within the unit have indicated their choice by the execution of 
dues deduction authorization cards which are current, or by individual 
designation cards which have been executed within six months prior to 
the [certification.] date of the director's decision recommending 
certification without an election. The determination by the director that 
the indications of employee support are not sufficient for certification 
without an election is a ministerial act and will not be reviewed by the 
board. 
2. Subdivision (b) of section 204.3 is hereby amended to read as 
follows: 
204.3(b) Motion for particularization of the charge. If the charge'is 
believed by a respondent to be so vague and indefinite chat it cannot 
reasonably be required to frame an answer, the respondent may, within 
10 working days after receipt from the director of a copy of the charge, 
file an original and four copies of a motion with the administrative law-
judge for an order directing the charging party to file a verified statement 
supplying specified information. The filing of such motion will extend 
the time during which the respondent must file and serve its answer until 
10 working days from the ruling of the administrative law judge on the 
motion, or until such later date as the administrative law judge may set. 
Such a motion must be served upon the charging party simultaneously 
with its filing with the administrative law judge; proof of service must 
accompany the filing of the motion with the administrative law judge. 
The charging party may file a response to the motion within seven 
working days of its receipt thereof, with proof of service of a copy of 
the response on all other parties. The failure of a party to timely comply 
with an order of particularization may, in the discretion of the 
administrative law judge, constitute ground for precluding the party from 
offering any evidence as to the matters dealt with by the order. 
3. Subdivision (d) of section 204.3 is hereby amended to read as 
follows: 
204.3(d) Motion for particularization of the answer. If the statement 
of facts supporting any affirmative defense is believed by a charging party 
to be so vague and indefinite that such charging party cannot reasonably 
be expected to address them in an expeditious manner at a hearing, such 
charging party may, within 10 working days after receipt of the answer, 
file with the administrative law judge an original and four copies of a 
motion for an order directing the respondent to file a verified statement 
supplying specified information. Such a motion must be served upon che 
respondent simultaneously with its filing with the administrative law 
judge; proof of service must accompany the filing of the motion with the 
administrative law judge. The respondent may file a response to the 
motion within seven working days of its receipt thereof, with proof of 
service of a copy of the response on ail other parties. The failure of a 
party to timely comply with an order of particularization may, in the 
discretion of the administrative law judge, constitute ground for 
precluding the party from offering any evidence as to the matters dealt 
with by the order. 
4. A new subdivision (g) is hereby added to.section 204.3 to read as. 
follows: 
204.3(g) A public employer which is made a party to an improper 
practice charge pursuant to section 209-a.3 of the act may file responsive 
pleadings in accordance with section 204.3(a), (b), (c), (d) and (ej of this 
Part. The administrative law judge may deem the public employer's 
failure 10 file any responsive pleading to constitute a waiver of the public 
employer's right to participate in any hearing held on the allegations oi 
impropriety set forth in the charge. 
5. Section 207.7 is hereby amended to read as follows: 
207.7 Selection process. After receipt of a demand for arbitration or 
submission co arbitrate, the director of conciliation shall forward to the 
representatives named therein two copies of an identical panel list of [five; 
seven arbitrators selected from the panel of arbitrators. A resume, 
including per diem fee, of each arbitrator on such panel list shall be 
enclosed for the parties' review. Each party shall have 10 days from date 
of the letter containing the panel list in which to select, rank and return 
their selections to the director of conciliation. 
6. Subdivision (a) of section 207.7 is hereby amended to read as 
follows: 
207.7(a) Selection and preferential ranking. Unless the parties have 
provided for their own method of selecting an arbitrator in their 
agreement to arbitrate, the following process for the selection of an 
arbitrator shall be employed: if more than [three] four names on the 
panel list are acceptable, those names shall be ranked in order of the 
party's preference and the remaining [name] namets), if any, shall be 
stricken. Otherwise the party shall strike no more than [two] three names 
from the panel list and indicate a preference among those names 
remaining by ranking them (I) [(2) and (3).] (2), 13) and (4). 
7. Subdivision (b) of section 207.7 is hereby amended to read as 
follows: 
207.7(b) Additional lists. If a party determines that more than [two] 
three names on a panel list are unacceptable, a request by such party for 
an additional panel list shall be filed with the director of conciliation 
within the 10-day time period established for selection and preferential 
ranking. A copy of such requesc shall be sent to the other party 
simultaneously. Each party shall have the right to request one additional 
list, and consequently, no party shall receive more than three panel lists. 
Pursuant to the selection process, if the parties fail to select an arbitrator 
after the submission of a third panel list, the director of conciliation shall 
take whatever steps are necessary to designate an arbitrator. 
8. Section 207.16 is hereby amended to read as follows: 
207.16 Filing of the award and arbitration report form.. Within 10 days 
of rendering an award, the arbitrator shall file [two copies] one copy of 
the award with the director of conciliation. Upon completion of the 
assignment, the arbitrator shall submit to the director of conciliation an 
arbitration report form showing a detailed accounting of fees and 
expenses (if any) and other relevant information concerning the final 
disposition of the issue(s) in dispute. 
9. Subdivision (a) of section 210.1 is hereby amended to read as 
follows: 
210.1(a) Filing of petition. Any person, employee organization or 
employer may file with the director an original and four copies of a 
petition for a declaratory ruling with respect to the applicability of the 
act to it or any other person, employee organization or employer, or with 
respect to the scope of negotiations under the act. The petition shall be 
in writing on a form prescribed by the director and shall be signed and 
sworn to before any person authorized to administer oaths. 
Text of proposed rule or revised proposed rule, the regulatory impact 
statement, if any, and the regulatory flexibility analysis, if any, may be 
obtained from: Sandra M. Nathan, Public Employment Relations 
Board, 80 Wolf Rd., Albany, NY 12205-2604, (518) 457-2678 
Data, views or arguments may be submitted to: Same as above. 
Regulatory Impact Statement 
1. Statutory authority: 
Civil Service Law, Article 14, section 205.5 empowers the Public 
Employment Relations Board (PERB or the Board) to adopt, amend and 
rescind rules relevant to its jurisdiction, the resolution of disputes 
concerning the representation status of employee organizations, the 
prevention of improper practices, the resolution of collective bargaining 
disputes through arbitration and the scope of mandatory bargaining. The 
proposed amendments concern procedures involving these subjects. 
2. Legislative objectives: 
The proposed rules better ensure that an employee organization which 
utilizes individual designation cards as a basis for PERB certification 
without an election will not unreasonably be denied such certification. 
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The proposed rules clarify that parties may file papers in response to 
motions for particularization of improper practice charges and answers. 
The proposed rules clarify that a public employer may file a responsive 
pleading in an improper practice proceeding in which it has been alleged 
that an employee organization breached its duty of fair representation in 
processing, or failing to process, a claim against such public employer 
and, further, clarify the possible consequence to an employer which fails 
to file any responsive pleading. 
The proposed rules enlarge the list of panel arbitrators from which 
parties may choose an arbitrator to preside at a voluntary grievance 
arbitration and thereby expedite the selection process.-They also provide 
for the filing of only one copy of the arbitration award with PERB and 
thereby eliminate the filing of unnecessary paper. 
The proposed rules clarify the form to be filed by a party seeking a 
declaratory ruling. 
3. Needs and benefits: 
The amendments^ would clarify existing rules and practices, expedite 
proceedings before PERB and reduce paperwork. 
4. Costs: 
(a) Costs to State government: None. 
(b) Costs to local government: None. 
(c) Costs to private regulated parties: None. The proposed rules do not 
regulate private parties. 
(d) Costs to the regulating agency for implementation and continued 
administration of the rule: (i) The initial cost to PERB for printing forms 
to be completed by parties seeking declaratory rulings pursuant to 
proposed amendment to section 210.1(a) will be S67.00: (ii) the projected 
annual cost is 513.40. 
5. Paperwork: 
(i) A party seeking a declaratory ruling from PERB must file a petition 
for declaratory ruling on a form prescribed by PERB. A public employer 
may file with PERB a responsive pleading in an improper practice 
proceeding in which it is alleged that an employee organization breached 
its duty in processing, or failing to process, a claim against the said public 
employer. A party seeking to respond to a motion for particularization 
of either an improper practice charge or an answer may file such a written 
response with PERB. 
(ii) There are no nesv reporting requirements that will be added to 
existing forms or reports. However, a petition for declaratory ruling must 
be signed and sworn before a person authorized to administer oaths. 
(iii) There is no new or additional recordkeeping that will be required 
of a regulated party to comply with the proposed amendments or to prove 
compliance with them. 
6. Duplication: 
The proposed amendments do not duplicate existing state and federal 
requirements since there are no other state laws or any federal laws 
regulating the same subject or activity, i.e., collective bargaining in the 
public sector (excluding the federal government) in the State of New 
York. 
7. Alternatives: 
There were no significant alternatives to be considered.. 
8. Local government mandates: 
A public employer/local government may file a responsive pleading to 
an improper practice charge alleging that a public employee organization 
breached its duty of fair representation with respect to processing, or 
failing to process, a claim that such public employer/local government 
breached its agreement with such employee organization. The public 
employer/local government's failure to file such a responsive pleading 
may be deemed a waiver of the public employer/local government's right 
to participate in any hearing held on thw improper practice charge. 
A public employer/local government seeking a declaratory ruling must 
file a petition signed and sworn to before a person authorized to 
administer oaths on a form prescribed by the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation, 
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis 
1. Effect on Small Businesses: 
None. 
2. Compliance Requirements: 
None. 
3. Professional Services: 
None. 
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4. Compliance Costs: 
None. 
5. Minimizing Adverse Impact: 
The proposed rules will have no adverse economic impact on small 
businesses because the proposed rules have no effect on small businesses. 
The proposed rules apply only to public sector employers, labor 
organizations and employees. 
6. Small Business Participation: 
Section 202-b(6) of the State Administrative Procedure Act is not 
applicable to PERB's rule making. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
N O T I C E O F A D O P T I O N 
Report Forms by Various Telecommunications Companies 
I.D. No. PSC-05-90-00016-A 
Filing date: Feb. 7, 1992 
Effective date: Feb. 7, 1992 
PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE State Administrative 
Procedure Act, NOTICE is hereby given of the following action: 
Action taken: The commission, on Jan. 29, 1992, adopted an order in 
Case 90-C-0018 approving annual report forms for telephone 
corporations. 
Statutory authority: Public Service Law, section 95 
Subject: Report forms—223 telephone corporations, 225 other common 
carriers and 235 cellular communication companies (Case 12233). 
Purpose: To prescribe a new annual report form for cellular 
communications companies and to amend the annual report forms for 
other common carriers, AT&T Communications of New York, Inc. and 
local exchange carriers. 
Substance of final rule: The Commission approved Annual Report Form 
for Cellular Corporations (Form 235) and the new and/or revised 
schedules to Annual Report Forms 223 and 225, which forms must 
conform to the terms, conditions and requirements set forth in the order. 
Final rule compared with proposed rule: No changes. 
Text of rule may be obtained from: Michele Hacker, Assistant to the 
Secretary, Public Service Commission, Bldg. 3, Empire State Plaza, 
Albany, NY 12223, (518) 474-6506 
Assessment of Public Comment 
An assessment of public comment is not submitted with this notice 
because the rule is within the definition contained in section 102(2)(a)(ii) 
of the State Administrative Procedure Act. 
(90-C-001SSA1) 
N O T I C E O F A D O P T I O N 
DSM Bidding Projects by New York State Electirc & Gas Cor-
poration 
I.D. No. PSC-22-91-0O007-A 
Filing date: Feb. 7, 1992 
Effective date: Feb. 7, 1992 
PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE State Administrative 
Procedure Act, NOTICE is hereby given of the following action: 
Action taken: The commission, on Dec. 11, 1991, approved the petition 
of New York State Electric & Gas Corporation concerning a potential 
revision to its 1991-1992 demand-side management (DSM) plan (Case 91-
E-0480). 
Statutory authority: Public Service Law, sections 5(2), 66(1) and (5) 
Subject: Demand-side management bidding projects. 
Purpose: To combine two demand-side management bidding projects for 
administrative efficiency, incorpoate more accurate financial estimates in 
the new unified project, and increase certain demand-side management 
budgetary levels. 
